Valuation always comes out in the wash & other lessons from Spinvox

After a fascinating Seedsummit, this weekend brought the other extreme of start-up investing: Spinvox’s alleged fire sale to Nuance for £92m.

Some people have been asking how £92m could be seen as a fire sale? And how come, according to the Sunday Times, Christina Domecq will end up with nothing?

The answer is simple: Spinvox had raised between £120 and £150m in capital, most recently in a series of very tough bridging loans. These totalled some £73m in various loan instruments to Tilsbury, according to the Register.

Most of these loans would have attracted high interest rates, as Spinvox would neither have had the assets for collateral or cashflow to service loan payments. (Spinvox’s revenus next year were forecast at £7m, according to The Times.)

Loans are senior to equity, meaning that on a disposable of the company bondholders receive their money in full before equity holders see any. £92m does not go very far when Spinvox was holding as much debt as it did.

Is this an achievement? You be the judge. Turning £150m of investors capital into £92m is an achievement in some (very rare) circumstances.

As to the executives, well they rightly would have held the lowest class of shares-to be paid out after everyone who has actually taken financial risk (i.e. put real pounds and pence on the line) has been paid out.

There are a two lessons here for many of the parties involved:

  1. Valuation always comes out in the wash: You can raise massive tranches of capital with a good name, smart advisors and a slick presentation. And some of it may be on lenient terms. But as an entrepreneur, you then set the bar for your success extremely high. The higher this bar, the more likely that as your business naturally deviates from your monoline plan, you’ll need more capital and those new investors will lay down tougher terms. So Spinvox may be sold for £92m but for its common shareholders (including its earliest investors and its staff), it may as well has been declared insolvent.
    This might have been so very different if Spinvox had adopted a ‘hypothesise, build, test, improve, invest’ model, edging there way forward as they ironed out commercial, technology and operational issues. The funding announcements may have been less gob-smacking but the success for shareholders may have been better.
  2. As @maxniederhofer says: it proves that not everyone can do early stage investing.

Spinvox (the product/service) will probably find a good home in Nuance, which is really the leader in speech processing, and wtih 40+ carrier relationships Nuance is probably getting a good deal for its £92m. As for staff who were paid in equity over the summer…

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  • I think IBM powered Simulscribe / PhoneTag. Nuance could power SV. Take out the cost layer of people translation. But they have to see a new model in there based on 30m users, otherwise where's the value? Ribbit, GV, and others are commoditising the speech to text space, and the service proposition. The base line tech used by SV must overlap someway with Nuance, or else the operator relationships/ legals hold up even with Nuance-powered SV.

    Technology Risk, Product - Market Fit, and Scaling should not be simultaneous processes.

    Have to say, I am sceptical of this as a buy out.
  • The Times was referring to £7m 'earnings': "Spinvox is projected to earn £7m next year and £30m in 2011 after signing contracts with several mobile operators."

    I think this is supposed to mean £7m profit, not £7m revenue.

  • davidgilbey
    A great post and some interesting comments. As a fellow UK tech entrepreneur I take my hat off to them for their ability to raise money, and of course for giving it a go - and "no comment" re their alleged inventive technology.

    Having spent an unhealthy amount of time in the last few months talking to consumers about their technology and other needs I would actually question how much of an unmet need there was to meet?

    And, as an "operator" rather than a "investment-raiser", I agree absolutely that Spinvox illustrates well the point that the skills requited to raise money are different to what's needed to build a business. And, at the least, getting both of these right requires an open, transparent, colaborative relationship between a business' founders and investors.

    David Gilbey
    Co-founder, AskPeopleYouKnow.com








  • Azeem this is a great post -- it's good to be looking into failures as well.

    It seems that "scaling stage" went very wrong here. After a demonstrated success in getting a proposition in the market that met a real need, the outsider's view on this is:

    1/ Users monetized really poorly. If they did have 30 million users, that's a dismal revenue level. Either that or this revenue figure is net of certain costs involved in providing the service (see below).
    2/ Apparently carriers were late in paying -- maybe the CFO can write a how-to "of the importance of working capital when growing agressively..." so we can all learn from what happened. Reminiscent of Amped.
    3/ The word on the street from people who looked at the deal is that the tech was never all it was cracked up to be. That per se is no bad thing if you are careful about how you scale and engineer as you go. But if you scale the heck out of a human-augmented business, you are not going to have great contribution to the bottom line, are you ? This may be where the Nuance combo brings much needed back-end weight.
    4/ I hold it from some folks at the company that the level of agression was incredible. A take-no prisoner approach. May have lacked humility.
    5/ Max: GS has had its fair of success including in seat-of-the-pants growth businesses. Talked to Chris Lynch last week who was singing the praises of Pete Perrone, for example, as one of the best he has worked with.

    Felling sorry for the employees and team here, hope they (some of them at least) got some nice retention packages at Nuance.
  • Awesome comments, Fred.
    But it sounds like the scaled very aggressively commercially and needed to ramp up human transcription to cope with gaps in the technology.
    As you point out the essence of the business model is to be able to minimise the call centres in favour of the technology. In other words, the fundamental business proposition may as been as sound as my saying: "I am going to launch a sub-space tourism business for £50 a flight. Next year." (And that'll sell like hotcakes as long as my investors are prepared to subsidise my customers.)
    I wonder if the fast pace of commercial expansion would have diverted technical resources and management time away from solving the core technology problem (the transcription) as they struggled to build systems to cope with the operational realities of transcribing millions of messages a day by hand.
    Reminds me so much of Boo.com, it's uncanny.
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